Withdrawing from Afghanistan: what next?

As I write the news of “four Nato-led” soldiers killed in Afghanistan is coming through to our newsroom.

The defence secretary was keen to stress to the House of Commons today that the numbers of troops facing nine instead of six months in the heat of Helmand, will be relatively small. Though he would not, could not, get into precise numbers.

The slippage was also there, Philip Hammond saying that some British troops will serve into 2015, albeit in “non combat” roles.

And this is where the really critical debate is going on right now in Afghanistan. Some more words from Mr Hammond on this to the house today:

“First, it will better align the final tours with key milestones in the transition process such as the Afghan presidential elections in spring 2014.

“Secondly, it will help to maintain continuity in posts where we work closely with our Afghan partners at a time when retaining and bolstering Afghan confidence is critical – both for mission success and to ensure our own force protection.”

Stripped away and condensed into plain English, this is the signal that – whatever the British say in public – in private serious concerns remain about an Afghan army and its ability to maintain security in a country where Nato/USA have failed to achieve military victory.

Let us be brutally honest. The greatest potential uber-arsenal planet earth has ever seen has failed to establish peace, control and the writ of the (kleptocratic) Kabul government running throughout the land, in more than 11 years of fighting.

Indeed this is America’s longest war. They’ve lost it and are about to leave. With them, in defeat, the British and all the other small components of the US- dominated Nato force in the country.

The stomach and political will has gone.

What next?

But what concerns us here in these last days is that, if the Nato/US arsenal and technology cannot do the job, then how will the Afghan army?

For sure, their human intelligence and granular appreciation of their war in their country of their culture will way surpass anything the Nato/USA alien invaders could ever achieve. Although doubts must arise over a largely non-Pashtun army seeking to command and control the restive Taliban/Pashtun areas of the south and east where they may not speak the language nor deeply understand the culture.

But the loyalty of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to its internal chain of command has been found wanting. There have been desertions. They have no real air force to speak of by way of air support for ground forces engaged with the internal Afghan insurgency.

So expect a lot of talk about some troops in fact staying beyond 2014, though not in a combat role. Expect too, that what actually is or is not a “combat role” to become increasing blurred in the bloody realities of continued fighting.

Nato military planners will be well aware that the myth of Afghanistan collapsing into chaos when the Soviets left is precisely that: a myth. In fact the country enjoyed reasonable stability and at least reasonable government at the hands of Najibullah and his (at least by Afghan traditions) technocratic and quite secular government. Only when the Soviet Union fell apart and comrade Yeltsin was a comrade no more, nor able to pay the bills, did Moscow finally pull the plug after a couple of years.

The hapless Najib ended strung up from a lamppost by the incoming Afghan fighters, and Kabul was duly pulverised into violent chaos and endless rocket salvoes.

Quite genuinely, the west does not want to see that happen again. But can you really stop it with drones, air support and only the ANA actually out on the ground fighting?

That’s the real question and the critical debate now being had to plaster over this obvious mess and manage retreat as best as possible for the Afghans and their future.

In Kabul they do not wonder about the hardships of British lads on the ground down in Helmand for six, seven, eight, nine or however many months. They are too busy getting their money out of the country, fearful of the future. There are large blocks of flats in the capital where construction’s stopped months ago, as the inward investment dries up and confidence scatters in the high dry winds of this dusty city.

A longer tour of duty for British forces doing little patrolling and still less fighting is an inconvenience no doubt, albeit with extra daily payments in their pockets. For Afghans across the country the prospect is a great deal more terrifying and potentially lethal.

No wonder so many of the rich are getting out whilst they can.

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