MoD secret files bungle: redaction to retraction
The MoD scrambled to remove online documents containing secret information about nuclear submarines which it accidentally published, despite having guidelines that would have prevented the error.
Large sections of a Ministry of Defence (MoD) report which appeared to have been redacted (blacked out) to avoid showing classified or sensitive information, or indeed displaying individuals’ names protected under the Data Protection Act, were available to be read by anyone with a computer.
The Daily Telegraph said it was a simple case of “copying and pasting” “blacked out” paragraphs into another document where they could then be seen. In other instances of administrative inefficiency, passages covered in black marker pen could be read by printing the document and holding the paper up to the light.
The sensitive passages have since been properly redacted but were reported to include expert opinion about the fleet’s ability to withstand a catastrophic accident.
Last month, Channel 4 News reported that the reactors that power Britain’s naval submarines are “potentially vulnerable” to fatal nuclear accidents, after seeing the report.
The insufficiently covered-up report also made available details of measures used by the US Navy to protect its own nuclear submarines.
The document involved was an assessment drawn up by the head of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, Commodore Andrew McFarlane, over options for the reactors in future submarines to replace the Trident fleet.
In sections released intentionally on the Parliament website, it concluded that the existing reactors were “potentially vulnerable” to fatal accidents – leading ministers to suggest new versions would be used.
“Current UK practice falls significantly short of benchmarked relevant good practice,” he warns. The pressurised water reactors that run submarines are “potentially vulnerable to a structural failure of the primary circuit”.
Serious concerns are expected to be raised about MoD officers charged with redacting documents, because comprehensive guidelines have long been in place to avoid embarrassing and potentially dangerous errors.
The National Archives’ guidelines, published in 2006, even warns that the process of effectivley redacting documents is often “poorly misunderstood”.
“The mechanisms by which information is stored within [electronic] formats are often poorly understood. In addition, cryptographic and semantic analysis techniques can potentially be used to identify redacted information,” it reads.
The MoD was not the only Government department to make administrative errors.
A Department of Health document regarding a private meeting to discuss contaminated blood inadvertently named officials and experts involved: their names could be read by holding the paper up to the light.
The National Archives’ guidlines also stressed the regularity with which the mistake is made.
“The redacted version should then be photocopied again to produce an access version. The further photocopy is necessary as information redacted using marker pen can be read when held up to light.”
An MOD spokesman said: “As soon as we were told about this, we took steps to ensure the document was removed from the public domain and replaced by a properly redacted version. We take nuclear security very seriously and we are doing everything possible to prevent a recurrence of this.”