The Blair Doctrine : buried in Libyan sand?

How Tony Blair must be angry. Colonel Gaddafi, the man he brought in from the cold, is isolated again and retreating. His armed supporters have gunned down scores of protesters demanding the end of 42 years of autocratic rule. The revolution has finally started to catch up with the old revolutionary. The British-led, Blair-led rehabilitation of the dictator from enemy to friend has all gone horribly wrong. After all, we can’t be friends with leaders who kill their own people. That’s the kind of thing we went to war with Saddam Hussein for, isn’t it? And now even the Americans are criticising Britain for being too nice to Gaddafi : the US Ambassador says giving the Libyan leader stature was a mistake.

Mr Blair must have hoped President Gaddafi would be the model despot. Having been public enemy number one, having supported ‘terrorism’, shielded the murderer of a British policewoman, railed against Western Imperialism, helped the enemies of the British state and flirted with weapons of mass destruction the Colonel had become our ‘friend’. Britain had proudly paraded him as the example of how dangerous states can be turned around, and Tony Blair had been the apostle of peace. The dividend would come in a safer world, and enormous boosts for British business, not least BP which was in search of oil in stable political environments. Gaddafi’s turnaround was supposedly a product of the Blair Doctrine on liberal intervention. Faced with a new global order in which there were rules that led to consequences (such as the fates that befell Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein) the Colonel had been forced to cave in, ditch his weapons ambitions and embrace the global community. So goes the theory.

“If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.” When Tony Blair uttered those words on the 24th April 1999 in his Chicago speech he had the lesson of Hitler in mind. The speech was a charter for future intervention, the rules for when to go to war. But Blair was clear that this didn’t apply to every nasty regime we just didn’t really like :

“Looking around the world there are many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts. If we wanted to right every wrong that we see in the modern world then we would do little else than intervene in the affairs of other countries. We would not be able to cope.”

The Blair argument went on to lay out the five conditions for war : are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long term? And finally do we have national interests involved?

Apply the Blair Doctrine to the wave of revolution around the Middle East and North Africa and we are still on point 2. There are many diplomatic avenues to pursue, whether direct or indirect. But Britain under the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats is taking a cautious diplomatic line, refusing to call time on Gaddafi now even when his regime appears to have killed hundreds of protesters. The Foreign Secretary says the behaviour is “unacceptable” and “shocking”. But the Libyan leader  does not appear to be quaking in his sandals.

What the Blair Doctrine failed to define, and what our current government are simply refusing to address is when a merely undemocratic and barbarous regime becomes one we are sure must be opposed? Is it 200 people shot on the streets? 2000? Or do we have to wait until 20,000 are dead before it is unequivocally a humanitarian disaster that requires action?

It might well be that the British government is taking the course best for British interests. It is not inevitable that every revolution will succeed. But if you are looking for rules that can be applied over when autocrats become enemies you could have a long wait. Would Tony Blair, with his Chicago speech doctrine, even call for Gaddafi to step down? We don’t know that either. It wasn’t supposed to turn out like this.